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Abstract—Bitcoin’s success has led to significant interest in
its underlying components, particularly Blockchain technology.
Over 10 years after Bitcoin’s initial release, the community still
suffers from a lack of clarity regarding what properties defines
Blockchain technology, its relationship to similar technologies,
and which of its proposed use-cases are tenable and which are
little more than hype. In this paper we answer four common
questions regarding Blockchain technology: (1) what exactly
is Blockchain technology, (2) what capabilities does it provide,
and (3) what are good applications for Blockchain technology,
and (4) how does it relate to other approache distributed
technologies (e.g., distributed databases). We accomplish this
goal by using grounded theory—a structured approach to
gathering and analyzing qualitative data—to thoroughly an-
alyze a large corpus of literature on Blockchain technology.
This method enables us to answer the above questions while
limiting researcher bias, separating thought leadership from
peddled hype and identifying open research questions related
to Blockchain technology. The audience for this paper is broad
as it aims to help researchers in a variety of areas come to
a better understanding of Blockchain technology and identify
whether it may be of use in their own research.
Keywords-Blockchain, decentralized governance, distributed
ledger, provenance, auditability, resilience.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, David Chaum [1] proposed using blind signatures
to allow for untraceable electronic payments. Later, Chaum,
Fiat and Naor [2] expanded this idea into a fully fleshed out
electronic cash system. eCash was the first cryptocurrency—
i.e., “a digital currency in which encryption techniques
are used to regulate the generation of units of currency
and verify the transfer of funds operating independently of
a [nation-state-controlled] central bank.”1 However, early
cryptocurrencies still required the presence of a central party
to help manage the creation and transfer of funds.
Two decades after eCash was first proposed, an author
using the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto wrote a white paper
∗The majority of this work was completed while these authors worked
at MIT Lincoln Laboratory.
1https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/cryptocurrency
describing Bitcoin, a new decentralized cryptocurrency [3].
Unlike centralized cryptocurrencies which rely on a set of
known entities to operate, Bitcoin uses a proof-of-work-
based scheme [4], [5] to allow the general public to maintain
the system. To incentivize public participation, Bitcoin pays
participants (known as miners) for solving the proof-of-work
puzzles. While Bitcoin’s building blocks were not novel, the
composition of these properties into a single system was a
meaningful contribution [6] which led the cryptocurrency to
become the first to achieve widespread popularity and usage.
At the peak of its popularity, Bitcoin’s market capitalization
reached $835.69 billion (USD), though at the time of
this writing it has seen a decrease in both its stature
and market capitalization ($60.78 billion). Nevertheless,
there remains significant interest in the question of whether
the technology underlying Bitcoin—known as Blockchain
technology or Blockchain for short—could be used to build
other interesting cryptocurrencies or distributed systems. In
particular, we have consistently heard researchers, business
executives, and government leadership ask the following four
questions: (1) what exactly is Blockchain technology, (2)
what capabilities does it provide, and (3) what are good
applications for Blockchain technology, and (4) how does
it relate to other approache distributed technologies (e.g.,
distributed databases).
Unfortunately, there is a lack of clarity regarding the
answers to these questions in both the community and the
literature, impeding the ability for researchers to properly
understand, evaluate, and leverage Blockchain technology.
This lack of clarity stems at least in part from competing
viewpoints and terminology regarding Blockchain technology,
resulting in seemingly contradictory statements that can all
be true in their respective contexts. In this paper, we attempt
to address this ambiguity and provide a holistic overview
of Blockchain technology, set forth a common lexicon for
discussing Blockchain technology, and answer the questions
identified above.
To accomplish these goals, we conducted a textual analysis
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Academia Industry
Increased interest recently Long-term interest
Focused on specific subsystems Takes a holistic view
Technical experts Use case experts
Table I: Academic vs. industrial sources
of papers on Blockchain technology from non-academic
sources (hereafter referred to as industry). The choice to
focus our analysis on literature from industry was based
on the unique suitability of that literature (see Table I) to
answer the questions we identified above: First, industry
became heavily involved in Blockchain technology before
academia and thus has had more time to fully consider its
implications. Second, industry literature tends to discuss and
evaluate Blockchain technology holistically, which provides
the broad perspective needed to answer questions one and
two. Finally, much of industry literature is written by use
case experts who are well positioned to answer the third
question.
In contrast, academic literature focuses on technical deep
dives on Blockchain technology’s subsystems and implemen-
tations built on Blockchain technology. For example, existing
academic surveys on Blockchain technology have focused
on particular systems or technical properties: Bitcoin [7],
[6], payment privacy [8], security and performance [9],
scalability [10], and consensus protocols [11], [12]. In this
regard, the existing literature acts as a complement to this
paper—i.e., researchers interested in Blockchain technology
can read this paper to gain a holistic overview of the space
and then dive deeply into specific subtopics by reviewing
other Blockchain survey papers.
Ultimately, our technical analysis was successful at an-
swering the questions identified previously, and in this paper
we present those answers. While some readers may find
the results of this paper unsurprising or differing from their
viewpoints regarding Blockchain technology, we believe that
this paper will be helpful to the community at large (both
Blockchain experts and non-experts) and provide a common
reference point for discussion on Blockchain technology.
Taken together, the results in this paper represent the most
complete overview of Blockchain technology and its potential
use cases available in a single work that we are aware of.
The results are intended to serve as an aid for researchers as
they field questions related to Blockchain and as they explore
whether Blockchain technology is relevant to their personal
research areas. Concretely, our key contributions are:
1) Providing a holistic overview of Blockchain tech-
nology’s technical properties and the capabilities
they enable. We organize the properties of Blockchain
technology into three groups: shared governance and
operation, verifiable state, and resilience to data loss.
Taken together, these properties differentiate Blockchain
technology from other distributed technologies. Us-
ing these properties, systems built with Blockchain
technology have easy access to a range of important
capabilities: full-system provenance, auditability, access
control, psuedonymity, automatic execution (i.e., smart
contracts), and data discoverability.
2) Identifying groups of applications (i.e., use cases)
that are most likely to benefit from Blockchain
technology. Within the literature we analyzed there
was a range of potential applications for Blockchain
technology. We group these applications into a set of
use cases and then discuss the likelihood that individual
applications within the use case would benefit from
the use of Blockchain technology. Example use cases
include cryptocurrencies, asset management, and multi-
organization data sharing.
3) Detailing challenges and limitations related to
Blockchain technology. As part of our review of the
literature, we identified several important challenges and
limitations for Blockchain technology: scalability, smart
contract correctness and dispute resolution, stapling of
on-chain tokens to off-chain assets, key management,
and regulation. Many of these challenges represent
important research questions with interesting potential
for future research.
4) Leveraging grounded theory to analyze industrial
literature while limiting research bias and separat-
ing hype from sound technical details. While there
are significant benefits to analyzing industrial literature,
there is also a significant amount of hype and imprecise
language. To address these limitations, we leveraged
the grounded theory methodology [13], [14], [15] (also
known as the constant comparative method) to extract
and separate valuable technical insights out from the
hype and technical misunderstandings that permeate
this body of work. Based on this analysis of data from
industry, interspersed with our own knowledge and
a review of the academic literature, we can answer
the common questions we identified while remaining
grounded in the data we analyzed. We were also
able to shed light on industry’s understandings and
misunderstandings of Blockchain technology.
II. METHODOLOGY
To more holistically understand Blockchain technology,
we conducted a rigorous textual analysis of Blockchain
literature from non-academic sources (hereafter referred to
as industry),2 including but not limited to source from the
technology, financial, and healthcare industries. While there
is valuable information to be learned from these sources,
analyzing them has certain challenges that while also present
in academic literature are usually less pronounced:
2Here, we consider industry broadly: corporations, small and medium
business, startups, and consortia.
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1) Lack of precise terminology and discussion. In our
review of materials from industry, we found that the
same concepts were often described using divergent and
imprecise terminology, leading to white papers that are
difficult to understand and provide muddled descriptions
of capabilities and use cases. Additionally, while there
is a fair bit of factually inaccurate information in
materials from industry (e.g., several documents claimed
cryptographic signatures provide confidentiality), in
several cases we observed an accurate description of
an idea that was phrased in such a way as to make
it seem incorrect under cursory examination. Some of
those ideas were assembled in ways that are interesting
to academics, if one takes the time to work through
the material. In this regard, materials from industry
represent a trove of useful information obscured by
imprecise terminology and discussion.
2) Inclusion of hype. Much of the material from industry
includes visionary statements (i.e., hype) about how
Blockchain technology will change business practices,
power dynamics and the way the world works. This hype
is a mixture of realistic use cases that can benefit from
Blockchain technology (e.g., anonymous payments [2])
and ideals that far transcend any technical solution (e.g.,
removing the need for governments). Unfortunately,
unlike what one would expect in academic literature,
the materials from industry often intermingle hype with
technical details. This at least partially explains why
some in academia are quick to dismiss sources from
industry.
3) Researcher bias. Researcher bias is an obvious problem
in any literature review—regardless of whether the
source is academia or industry—and one that is often
not explicitly addressed in systemization papers. The
potential for bias is even stronger when reviewing
materials from industry because the two issues described
above (lack of precise terminology and hype) make
it easy for researchers to dismiss out of hand ideas
proposed by industry.
For these three reasons, it is tempting to avoid analyzing
materials from industry, however, taking that approach would
sacrifice significant insights into BLockchain technology and
its use cases. Instead we employ a well-established research
method—grounded theory [13], [14], [15] (also known as
the constant comparative method)—to rigorously analyze the
data in a way that directly addresses each of these three
problems.
Grounded theory is used to analyze qualitative data sources
(e.g., user stories, interviews) and extract the underlying
data and processes described across the myriad of gathered
sources.3 In particular, grounded theory is designed to help
researchers identify data and processes within qualitative
data sources generated by humans and filled with imprecise
terminology and descriptions. Additionally, grounded theory
limits the impact of researcher bias, ensuring that the data
and processes are derived from the data and not from the
researchers’ preconceived notions of what the data says.
Grounded theory explicitly addresses the first and third
problems we identified for evaluating materials from industry,
and our hope was that it would also be able to separate the
hype from the underlying data and processing. We believe
these goals were satisfied based on our results.
The idea of using grounded theory for literature review is
not new [16], [17] and this method has been used in thousands
of studies examining qualitative data.4 For these reasons—
and based on our own experience with the method [18]—we
were confident this method would allow us to successfully
accomplish our research goals.
In the remainder of this section we first describe how we
gathered industry materials for our grounded theory analysis.
Next, we describe the grounded theory process in some
detail, as it may be unfamiliar to readers in this field. Lastly,
we describe an academic literature review we conducted to
enhance the results of our grounded theory analysis.
A. Industry Material Gathering
Beginning in the summer of 2016 we began to gather
documents published regarding Blockchain technology. This
included both materials from industry and academia, though
this section will focus on only the former. We gathered
materials using a variety of methods:
• Following RSS feeds that track news and publications
related to Blockchain technology (e.g., CoinDesk5).
• Downloaded materials published by Blockchain con-
sortiums (e.g., Hyperledger6, Decentralized Identity
Framework7) and their members (e.g., IBM, Microsoft,
Gem).
• Using Google to explore what was being said about
Blockchain technology by major accounting firms,
banks, and tech companies.
• Browsing new articles and blog posts related to
Blockchain technology. This included articles which
gave lists of interesting Blockchain papers.
• Reviewing submissions to the ONC Blockchain in
Health Care Competition.8.
3Grounded theory identifies data and processes that are supported across
the body of sources and is not a method for creating a fine-grained breakdown
of an individual document.
4As evidence of its wide use, the top-cited paper describing grounded
theory has 62,951 citations as of writing.
5https://coindesk.com
6https://www.hyperledger.org/
7http://identity.foundation/
8https://www.healthit.gov/topic/grants-contracts/announcing-blockchain-
challenge
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When reviewing these materials, we would also follow
references and include those documents if we believed they
were relevant. In total, we collected 132 documents across
three categories.
• High-Level Overviews. These were often prepared by
investment firms and gave high level overviews of
Blockchain technology. They would also reference
various efforts at using Blockchain in practice.
• System White Papers. These papers would describe how
Blockchain technology was used in a specific system,
or more frequently a system proposal.
• Blockchain Commentaries. These were generally shorter
documents that would discuss a specific facet of
Blockchain technology in greater depth than we saw in
other documents.
B. Grounded Theory Data Analysis
After collecting our initial set of 104 documents, we
analyzed them using grounded theory. This methodology
splits analysis of the documents into four stages: open
coding, axial coding, selective coding, and theory generation.
Throughout the analysis of the documents we kept detailed
research notes that outlined our thoughts as we reviewed and
analyzed the literature. Additionally, we conducted intensive
discussion between the various researchers to ensure that
we were correctly understanding and evaluating the source
material. As is often the case in grounded theory, these notes
and discussion were every bit as important, if not more so,
than the concepts, categories, and theories we generated.
1) Stage 1—Open Coding: In this first stage, documents
were assigned to one of four reviewers. Each reviewer would
read the document, assign codes to words and sentences
in the document. These codes were generated using a
mixture of open coding (assigning a code that summarizes
the document’s statement) and in situ coding (using the
document’s own words as the code). To ensure that we were
assigning the correct codes, we paid careful attention to the
context of each statement.
In particular, reviewers made sure to code the following
four concepts found in documents:
• Properties. What are the building blocks for Blockchain
technology? What capabilities does it provide?
• Challenges. What challenges must be addressed when
building systems using Blockchain technology?
• Limitations. What inherent limitations are there when
using Blockchain technology?
• Use cases. What applications or groups of applica-
tions (i.e., uses cases) benefit from the application of
Blockchain technology?
At this stage of the grounded theory process, reviewers
were instructed to avoid evaluating the validity of the coded
concepts. Instead, every attempt was made to include all
possible codes, helping to ensure that our results were
grounded in the data and not reviewers’ biases.
The reviewers continued reviewing documents until each
felt that the last 3–5 documents they had read had no concepts
that had not already been brought up by previous documents.
This is a commonly accepted stopping criteria in grounded
theory and is indicative that all core (i.e., not truly one-off)
ideas have been discovered. In total, this stage resulted in
the creation of 641 codes.
2) Stage 2—Axial Coding: In the second stage, our
research team used the constant comparative method to group
codes into concepts. Specifically, we collapsed distinct codes
referring to the same topic (e.g., one was an open code,
the other in situ) into a single code, reducing the original
set of 641 codes to a more manageable 68 concepts. As
needed, we referred to the original documents to ensure that
our understanding of the code was fresh, and that we were
assigning it to the appropriate concept. Also, at this stage
we continued to avoid evaluating the validity of concepts,
ensuring that the ideas of the reviewed documents were fully
reflected in the codes.
3) Interlude—Additional Open Coding.: After completing
axial coding, one reviewer coded (i.e., open coding) another
28 documents (giving the total of 132 documents). These
documents were all blog posts, representing the most up-
to-date thinking on Blockchain technology. In this process,
no new codes were discovered, indicating that our process
had produced concepts that thoroughly describe Blockchain
technology.
4) Stage 3—Selective Coding: In the third stage, two
researchers transferred the concepts related to technical
properties and applications onto sticky-notes. They then drew
connecting lines between these concepts, describing how
they related to one another. Based on these interconnections,
concepts were divided into five different categories:
• Technical properties (Figures 1, 5). Technical proper-
ties are the components that make up of Blockchain
technology. Examples include decentralized governance,
a consensus protocol, and an append-only transaction
ledger.
• Capabilities (Figure 2). Capabilities are the high-level
features provided by Blockchain technology’s technical
properties. Examples include automatic executions (i.e.,
smart contracts), internal auditability, and access control.
• Technical primitives. Primitives are the building blocks
used to construct the technical properties and capabilities
of Blockchain technology. Examples include timestamps,
hashchains, and peer-to-to-peer communication.
• Use cases. Use cases are classes of systems that the
literature identified as being good fits for Blockchain
technology. Examples include crytocurrencies, supply
chain management, and identity management.
• Normative properties (Figure 4). Normative properties
represent what people hope to achieve using Blockchain
technology. Importantly, these properties are not pro-
vided by the use of Blockchain technology—as are
4
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the technical properties and capabilities—but instead
require the careful designs of larger systems that might
only use Blockchain technology as a small piece of the
overall system. In general, normative properties strongly
relate to the hype surrounding Blockchain technology.
Examples include public participation, trustlessness, and
censorship resistance.
Our categorization resulted in 21 technical primitives, 14
technical properties, 12 normative properties, 13 capabilities,
and 15 use cases. While we divide the concepts into these
five categories, individual concepts are highly interconnected,
both inter- and intra-category. This provides credence to
the notion that Blockchain technology overall is a cohesive
whole, with each its component concepts serving a purpose
in the overall technology.
This is the first stage of our methodology where research
expertise directly influenced the results. First, by its very
nature drawing connections between concepts is subjective.
In most cases these connections were directly motivated by
explicit references in the text, but in several cases we drew
connections that we felt were implicit within the text. Second,
we identified several misconceptions that either shared no
connections with the rest of the concepts or were obviously
false (e.g., the assertion that cryptographic signatures provide
confidentiality). In both of these situations, our research notes
kept track of what was explicitly supported by the analyzed
data and what was the result of researcher interpretation.
5) Stage 4—Theory Generation: In the fourth and final
stage, we used the concepts, categories, and connections
derived from the first three stages of our grounded theory,
along with our research notes and researcher expertises to
derive several theories (i.e., research results from our analysis)
regarding Blockchain technology. First, we subdivided the
technical properties into three categories that give a high-level
description of what Blockchain technology is (see Section III).
Second, we extracted Blockchain technology’s capabilities
(Section IV), related challenges (Section V), and use cases
(Section VI). Third, we found that there is a clean split
between Blockchain technology’s technological primitives
and its normative properties (i.e., hype) (see Section VIII-A).
C. Limitations / Research Artifacts
Due to the nature of grounded theory, our analysis of the
data represents one view on that data. Different researchers
coding the same data may have focused on different aspects
leading to differences in categories, connections, and the
theories they focused on. To address this limitation, the
analyzed documents as well as the generated codes, concepts,
category graphs, and research notes will be available at
[blinded for peer review]. We invite other researchers to
review our work and to examine our collected documents
for other interesting contributions.
III. WHAT IS BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY?
Our literature analysis finds three key groupings of
properties related to Blockchain technology (see Figure 1).9
Most importantly, consensus is used to provide shared
governance and operation. In support of shared governance
and operation, other technical properties provide verifiable
state and resilience to data loss. By themselves, these
property groups are nothing new, but used together they
define Blockchain technology, or Blockchain for short. In
Section VII we describe how other distributed technologies
compare to Blockchain technology.
A. Shared Governance and Operation
Blockchain technology was created to address the scenario
in which a collection of parties—-referred to hereafter as
miners—want to participate in a communal system but do
not trust each other or any third party to operate the system
singlehandedly. By participating in both the governance
and operation of the system (i.e., shared governance and
operation), each miner can be assured that the system is
operating correctly. Even if some of the miners become
compromised, the uncompromised miners retain the ability
to detect malicious actions by the compromised miners and
to prevent them from interfering with the correct operation
of the system. In this regard, Blockchain technology provides
diffused trust wherein it is not individual miners but rather
the collective of all miners that is trusted.10
Shared operation is enabled by the use of consensus
protocols, which are used by the miners to agree upon
which operations—known as transactions—will be executed
by the system. The consensus protocols allow miners to
view transactions and validate that the system is operating
appropriately, an important consideration as the miners do
not trust that only valid transactions will be submitted to the
consensus protocol. Shared governance is provided by the
ability of miners to configure their clients to only approve the
transactions they believe are acceptable, effectively allowing
them to vote for how the system should function. If there is
disagreement regarding system functionality, it is possible for
a Blockchain-based system to split, resulting in the creation
of competing systems that include only a subset of each
other’s transactions. Usually these forks are temporary, with
miners either choosing to all adopt the same rules, but it is
possible for a fork to result in the permanent creation of two
non-interoperable Blockchain systems (e.g., Bitcoin Classic
and Bitcoin Cash).
Blockchain systems can be categorized based on who is
allowed to act as a miner:11
9A version of this chart that shows the technical primitives that support
the technical properties is given in the Appendix (see Figure 5).
10This property has often been called “trustlessness”; this is incorrect as
trust still exists but has simply been diffused among multiple parties.
11In our coding, we also identified the concept of private governance,
which eschews the notion of miners. This concept is discussed later in
Section VIII-B.
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Figure 1: Technical Properties for Blockchain Technology
• Open governance (i.e., permissionless Blockchains). Any
party that is willing to participate in the consensus pro-
tocol is allowed to do so. These systems are susceptible
to Sybil attacks, so it is necessary for them to use
consensus protocols in which miners prove ownership
and/or expenditure of some finite resource rather than
relying on proofs of identity. Proof-of-work [4], [5],
[19] (demonstrating ownership of computing resources)
and proof-of-stake [11], [12] (demonstrating ownership
of digital assets stored by the Blockchain system) are
the most common methods.
• Consortium governance (i.e., permissioned Blockchains).
Only approved miners that can attest to their identity
are allowed to participate in the consensus protocol.
The starting set of approved miners is defined at system
initialization. If this set never changes, it is known as a
static consortium. Alternatively, in an agile consortium
miners change over time, either based on the rules of the
system (e.g., random selection) or through consensus
by the existing miners. Because miners in a consortium
have known identities, they can use Byzantine fault
tolerance-based consensus protocols, which do not
require the resource expenditure of the Sybil-resistant
protocols used in open governance-based systems [11],
[12].
For each type of governance, there is a need to incentivize
correct participant behavior. The first type of incentive is
an intrinsic incentive—i.e., miners maintain the system
faithfully because they derive value from using it. Next, on-
chain incentives exist when the Blockchain system provides
direct benefits to miners for faithful execution (e.g., minting
currency and giving it to the miners). Finally, off-chain
incentives are any incentive that is not managed by the
Blockchain system—for example, contractual obligations or
individual reputation. Importantly, off-chain incentives only
apply to consortium governance as they inherently rely on
knowing the identity of the miners.
B. Verifiable State
Miners adopt Blockchain technology because they want
their trust to be rooted in the system—i.e., that the current
state of the system accurately reflects the transactions that the
consensus protocol allowed to execute in the past. To enable
this trust, Blockchain technology writes all transactions
to a cryptographically-verified append-only ledger [20],
providing full system provenance and allowing miners (or
outside parties) to audit the system’s current state and past
operations. In many systems, including Bitcoin, this ledger is
colloquially referred to as the “blockchain”, but we avoid that
term as it unnecessarily confusing to discuss both Blockchain
(big-B) technology and the blockchain (little-b) data structure.
The first entry in the append-only ledger is known as
the genesis block. The genesis block is responsible for
specifying the initial parameters for the system. Whenever
a new transaction is approved by the miners, it is added
to the ledger and cryptographically linked to one or more
preceding transactions (or the genesis block for the first
transaction) [21], [22], [23]—for example, by signing the
concatenation of the latest transaction and a hash of the
6
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transactions it is linked to. The resulting data structure can
be either linear (e.g., Bitcoin’s hash chain) or branching (e.g.,
a Merkle tree or directed acyclic graph). Regardless of the
underlying structure, it is critical that all transactions are
strictly ordered and that this ordering never changes after
consensus is reached.
C. Resilience to Data Loss
If the ledger was only stored in a single location, deleting or
modifying that data store could be detected by all parties, but
there would be no guarantee that the data could be restored.
In Blockchain technology, the ledger is replicated among
miners to address this single point of failure. When data
does need to be restored—for example, when an individual
miner’s ledger was corrupted—the replicated data can be
verified to ensure that it correctly represents the system state.
Some Blockchain systems try to limit the amount of data
any given miner needs to replicate by segmenting the data
and assigning miners to handle governance and operations for
only a subset of the system. This is known as sharding, with
individual segments of the data known as shards. Sharding
can drastically reduce the amount of data that miners need to
store while also increasing the performance of the consensus
protocol, which often scale based on the number of miners.
Still, sharding comes with the drawback that miners are no
longer able to audit the system as a whole. Additionally, by
reducing the number of miners responsible for any given
transaction, sharding also reduces the number of miners
an adversary would need to compromise to attack that
transaction.
IV. WHAT ARE BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY’S
CAPABILITIES?
Capabilities define the high-level functionality that can
be achieved by using Blockchain technology in a system’s
design. Blockchain’s three core capabilities were described in
the preceding section: (1) shared governance and operation,
(2) verifiable state, and (3) resilience to data loss. In our
coding, we identified 11 additional capabilities (see Figure 2).
Provenance and Auditability: Blockchain systems pro-
vide a complete history of all transactions that were approved
by the consensus process (i.e., full-system provenance). This
information can be used by the miners to audit the system
and ensure that it has always followed the appropriate rules.
Additionally, this information can be used by non-miners
to verify that the system is being governed and operated
correctly.
If transactions are used to store information regarding
digital or real-world resources, the resources must be stapled
to on-chain identifiers. Then the provenance information for
the Blockchain system can also be used to provide audit
information for those resources. This can be used to track
physical, off-chain assets (e.g., for supply chain management),
digital, off-chain assets (e.g., copyrighted digital media), or
digital, on-chain assets (e.g., cryptocurrencies or data files).
Access Control and Pseudonymity: Data stored in a
blockchain may have limitations regarding which users can
use it as an input to a transaction or modify it as part of the
operation of the transaction. For example, a financial asset
should only be a valid input to a transaction if the owner
of that asset approves its use. One approach to providing
this functionality is storing access control lists (ACLs) in
the blockchain and having the appropriate users prove their
identity to the miners (e.g., using Kerberos or OAuth 2.0)
as part of the transaction validation process.
More commonly, access control in a blockchain system
is implemented cryptographically: data is associated with a
public key when it is created and the ability to use or modify
this data as part of transaction is granted only to users that
can prove knowledge of the corresponding private key (e.g.,
by generating a signature over the transaction that validates
with the public key attached to the data). Ownership of the
data can be expanded or transferred by associating it with a
new public key.
On key benefit of access control using Blockchain is that
the provenance of access control is automatically recorded.
This means that a full record of not only a user’s permissions,
but how they received those permissions, is stored. This
information can be used to automatically revoke permissions
if it is discovered that a user was granted these permissions
by a compromised account—for example, when a malicious
insider grants inappropriate permissions to other insiders.
Key-based (as opposed to ACL-based) ownership of data
has another advantage: it allows for pseudonymous ownership
and use of data. Still, this requires careful attention in the
system design to use appropriate cryptographic techniques
(e.g., zero-knowledge proofs, mix networks, or secure multi-
party computation) to avoid linking real-world individuals to
their keys and actions. This remains an open problem.
Automatic Execution (Smart Contracts): Blockchain
transactions can also represent and store executable functions
known as smart contracts. These smart contracts can be
executed automatically in response to a function call in later
transactions, with both the inputs and outputs of the function
recorded within the calling transaction. The smart contracts
themselves are executed by the miners with outputs being
verified through the consensus protocol. The computational
power of these scripts is determined by the system’s rules,
ranging from supporting only basic functionality (e.g., veri-
fying a signature in Bitcoin) to providing Turing-complete
functionality (e.g., Ethereum).
Smart contracts benefit from Blockchain technology’s
other capabilities (e.g., shared operation, auditability, and
resilience). For example, multiple miners execute and verify
the output of a smart contract to help ensure that an adversary
is unable to tamper with the result of a function. Similarly, the
ability to audit inputs and outputs can be used to attribute
incorrect usage of a smart contract. Still, smart contracts
suffer from problems common to all programs (e.g., bugs,
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Figure 2: Capabilities for Blockchain Technology
security flaws, complexity, or non-termination) and a failure
to recognize this reality can lead to disastrous consequences.12
Data Discoverability: If users are allowed to read any
record in a Blockchain’s distributed data store, then it is
trivial to search for records of interest. This capability is
nothing more than what is provided by having a read-only
data lake, but still it was frequently discussed in the literature
we reviewed.
V. CHALLENGES FOR BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
Our analysis of the literature revealed several challenges
that need to be considered when developing systems using
Blockchain technology. In this section, we describe these
challenges and limitations. In Section IX, we survey academic
research that is attempting to address some of the challenges.
Note that this section is focused on challenges facing
Blockchain systems generally, not challenges facing specific
applications such as Bitcoin or Ethereum).
12This is best exemplified by the debate over “code is law” and the DAO
attack: https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/.
A. Scalability and Performance
Many documents in our corpus point out that Blockchain
technology’s decentralized governance and operation incur
significant overhead. The largest overheads incurred by
Blockchain technology are (1) the need to run a consensus
protocol before state can be updated, (2) the need to store
the full system provenance, and (3) the need for each miner
to store the ledger in its entirety. Any attempt to remove this
replication comes at the cost of resilience that Blockchain-
based systems often rely upon.
Additionally, most of today’s open governance Blockchain
systems are based on proof-of-work which bring additional
challenges. These proof-of-work schemes require users to
acquire hardware and expend electricity to participate in
consensus. The real-world cost of these schemes can be
tremendous—for example, it was estimated that as of April
2018 the energy consumed by Bitcoin miners alone was
equivalent to the power usage of almost 5.5 million US
households [24].
Another unintended consequence of proof-of-work is
the centralization of mining power. In order to reduce
variance in their earnings, miners are incentivized to work
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together in large mining pools, pooling their computing
power and sharing the profits among pool members. This
phenomenon has emerged in all large-scale proof-of-work
Blockchain systems13, and it is a problem because it inhibits
decentralization [26].
B. On-chain Correctness
All executable code is subject to bugs—developer errors
that can be taken advantage of to hijack program logic.
This problem manifests in smart contracts, and when those
contracts control the transference of valuable assets, the
impact of a bug can be devastating. The immutability
of a Blockchain’s ledger exacerbates this challenge by
impeding rollback of state changes, even those that are clearly
malicious. This is because, by definition, any transactions on
a blockchain upon which consensus is reached are considered
legal—including ones due to buggy code and exploitations
of such. If the miners decide to rollback the ledger to erase
a mistaken transaction than confidence in the Blockchain
system may be lost. Alternatively, if miners can’t agree what
to do about errant transactions, it could lead to a hard-fork
in the Blockchain system.
Despite best efforts to eliminate mistakes in smart contract
and transactions, a payment or asset transfer system must
be able to reverse fraudulent or errant transactions. For
example, if a user pays for a physical real-world good
using a cryptocurrency but is then never given the purchased
item. A new transaction reversing the effects of the disputed
transaction could be added to the ledger, but decentralized
governance makes arbitrating such a dispute difficult as there
is no individual arbiter with the authority to determine which
party is in the right when a dispute occurs. Additionally,
dispute resolution must be handled carefully to avoid intro-
ducing new vulnerabilities. For example, several attacks were
demonstrated against the Bitcoin refund mechanism [27]
necessitating further research to design secure refunds in
Bitcoin [28].
C. Off-chain stapling
Another challenge for applications is ensuring consistency
between on-chain state and the off-chain objects or state
that it represents. When Blockchain technology is used to
track off-chain assets (physical or digital), those assets are
typically represented on-chain by a digital identifier, or token.
When dealing with digital assets, correspondence between
the asset and its token can generally be maintained by code;
for example, a smart contract can track transference of
ownership for a digital media license. For physical assets,
however, maintaining this consistency is a challenge. Real-
world processes must be employed to ensure that whenever
an asset’s state or ownership is modified, the corresponding
token is updated. These processes are an obvious point of
13Currently almost 70% of Bitcoin blocks are mined by the five largest
mining pools [25]
failure as they rely on correct enforcement by trusted parties.
For example, a malicious entity could attach two tokens
to one asset, two assets to one token, or issue tokens that
have no backing asset (e.g. stocks in a naked short selling
scenario). The end user must also be trusted, as they may
be able to separate the token and sell it while keeping the
asset, causing the token to be attached to an invalid asset
(e.g., fake goods in luxury markets).
A related issue arises when Blockchain processes and
smart contracts need to use off-chain inputs. For example,
gambling contracts may determine which address to pay
winnings to based on the result of a request to an off-chain
oracle (e.g., sports scores, stock prices, weather forecasts,
or other global events). If contract logic branches based on
that response, the contract is no longer verifiable because
auditors cannot confirm that the response received from the
oracle at audit time is the same response received when the
contract was executed. There are legitimate reasons why an
oracle response might change with time, so this is really an
inherent limitation of Blockchain technology: smart contracts
cannot “see” external events. Thus, additional mechanisms
are needed to verify that these inputs cannot be forged.
D. Security
Due to its decentralized nature, Blockchain is potentially
vulnerable to a number of security threats. First, coordinated
attacks by a majority (or often even a large minority) of the
miners can reorder, remove, and change transactions from the
ledger. Thus, it is critical that Blockchain applications provide
the proper incentives to keep miners honest. In particular, it
is critical to design incentives such that the game theoretic
behavior for selfish miners is to honestly maintain the state
of the Blockchain system rather than to destroy it through
forming such coalitions.
Additionally, Blockchain technology is vulnerable to
traditional network attacks such as denial of service or
partitioning. Such attacks can aim to lower the number of
participating miners or to fracture the network of miners to
prevent consensus, lower the bar for 51% attacks, or create
an inconsistent state.
E. Privacy and anonymity
Another major challenge is how to protect the privacy of
the users and data stored on a Blockchain ledger. In basic
implementations, data on the ledger is public in order to
enable verification by all miners. But this means that any
sensitive data is inherently non-private. If confidentiality
is needed, it will be necessary to either host a Blockchain
system where only trusted entities can access it or by applying
advanced cryptographic techniques that will allow miners to
verify the correctness of encrypted transactions (e.g., multi-
party computation, functional encryption). Still, the use of
cryptography will limit the auditability and thus the ability
to have meaningful shared governance.
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Additionally, extreme care must be taken when trying to
build an anonymous Blockchain system. While many existing
Blockchain systems provide a notion of “pseudonymity” in
which users are identified by their cryptographic keys instead
of by their names or social security numbers, it has been
shown that this is not enough to provide true anonymity as
attacks that correlate transactions by the same pseudonyms
together with other data external to the Blockchain system
can effectively deanonymize users [29].
F. Usability
For developers, development and analysis tools are critical
to building secure applications in any domain. The availability
of user-friendly developer tools varies significantly depending
on the maturity of the target Blockchain platform. Some
projects, like Ethereum have mature tools, while others have
very little support. Many Blockchain platforms are currently
geared towards expert users and lack the user experience-
focused tools needed to allow for easier use by non-experts.
Another major challenge of some Blockchain systems
is that the require users to store, manage, and secure
cryptographic keys. However, this is known to be a significant
impediment for most users [30]. A survey by Eskandari et
al. [31] outlines these challenges as well as potential solutions
for managing keys for Bitcoin. They discuss solutions such
as password-protected and password-derived keys as well
as offline and air-gapped storage of the keys. But, as the
authors state all of these solutions have their drawbacks.
G. Legality and Regulation
Our analysis revealed wide-spread concern with regulatory
issues surrounding cryptocurrencies, Blockchain-based assets,
and other Blockchain applications. It is important to note that
regulation applies indirectly to technology, based on how the
technology is used within a firm’s operations. Therefore, there
will be no direct regulation of Bitcoin, for example, but rather
regulation of firms that use Bitcoin according to how they are
using it. Consider the example of a Bitcoin exchange service
that derives income from fees paid in Bitcoin: it will have to
consider tax declarations as a business (e.g., service taxes and
capital gains), financial reporting as a money service business
(e.g., know your customer, anti-money laundering and anti-
terrorist financing), generally acceptable accounting standards
for audited financial reports (e.g., reporting Bitcoin as an
intangible asset on a balance sheet), and potentially additional
regulation that applies to financial exchanges, banks, and/or
custodians. In most countries, each of these already broad
categories are administered by different government branches.
Countries like the United States and Canada may require
licensing or registration and have taken enforcement action
against non-compliant firms.
An extreme case of regulation is prohibition of cryptocur-
rencies or Blockchain-assets. At the time of writing, the
largest country to ban Bitcoin is Pakistan and the largest
country to prohibit wide categories of cryptocurrency use is
China.
VI. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY’S USE CASES
Within the literature we analyzed, there was significant
discussion about potential applications for Blockchain tech-
nology. We describe these use cases here. In many cases,
an argument could be made that these are not independent
use cases. Some use cases are subsumed by others, or two
use cases might have a common abstraction that make them
effectively the same. As authors, we attempt to categorize in
a way that is useful to the reader trying to locate information
about a particular use case. Before discussing the use cases
themselves, we first discuss the general parameters of when
a Blockchain is useful.
A. Financial Use Cases
Electronic currencies and payments: It is well-known
that Blockchain technology can be used to build cryptocur-
rencies; Bitcoin is a working example of this. Blockchain
technology enable electronic transactions that are resilient
even when large values are at stake. Bitcoin has notable
drawbacks that include scalability, performance and privacy.
There is ongoing research that demonstrates how Blockchain
technology can be used to create payment systems that are
low-latency and scalable, partially offline, confidential, and/or
anonymous (see Section IX).
Asset trading: Real world financial markets provide the
ability for the exchange of valuable assets. They tend to
involve intermediaries like exchanges, brokers and dealers,
depositories and custodians, and clearing and settlement
entities. Blockchain-based assets—which are either intrinsi-
cally valuable or are a claim on an off-chain asset (material
or digital)—can be transacted directly between participants,
governed by smart contracts that can provide custodianship,
and require less financial market infrastructure. For tokens
(i.e., digital identifiers) that represent something off-chain
(i.e., equity in a firm or a debt instrument), the issue of
stapling must be addressed. In most jurisdictions, financial
markets are subject to government oversight making this area
particularly encumbered by regulation.
Markets and auctions: A central component of asset
trading is the market itself—the coordination point for buyers
and sellers to find each other, exchange assets, and provide
price information to observers. Auctions are a common
mechanism for setting a fair price; this includes double-sided
auctions like the order books in common use by financial
exchanges. Decentralized markets and auction mechanisms
can run on Blockchain technology. The main challenge is
the issuance of non-confidential transactions. An additional
challenge is the potential for front-running by participants
in the Blockchain network (in particular, miners) who learn
of transactions before they are finalized.
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Insurance and futures: A transaction can be thought of
as a swap of one valuable asset for another. Swaps can be
arranged for a future time. Examples include agreeing to a
price for a future purchase of oil, turning a variable interest
rate into a fixed rate, and providing cash for collateral with
the promise that the cash will be returned. Further, this future
swap might be contingent on an event happening. Examples
include a derivative that is valuable if a stock price decreases,
an insurance payout for a fire, or a payment that covers a
loan default. The primary challenge of transactions of this
the risk that the counterparty will not fulfill their future
obligations. While Blockchain technologies can reduce some
types of trust, it cannot easily solve counterparty risk. It can
offer transparency which can be used to build reputation
and contracts can be designed to hold digital currency or
assets as collateral and disperse them if Blockchain-based
conditions are met. A second challenge for many of these use
cases is reporting real world events (a fire, a change in the
price of a stock, or mortgage default) to the Blockchain in a
trustworthy fashion. However, this is not an issue for events
that are Blockchain-based to begin with. This demonstrates
a key point: deploying several complimentary use cases on
the same Blockchain enables complex interactions.
Penalties, remedies, and sanctions: In common parlance,
code running on a Blockchain is called a smart contract.14
Legal contracts will often anticipate potential future breaches
and offer a set of penalties or remedies. With Blockchain
technology, a set of remedies could be programmed into the
contract assuming both the triggering event and the resulting
action are Blockchain-based (or the real-world/Blockchain
gap is bridged by a trustworthy entity). If the contract is
legally well-formed, with identified counterparties in a clear
jurisdiction, the remedies can be thought of as a set of
reasonable default actions that can avoid, but do not preclude,
expensive litigation.
B. Data Storage and Sharing Use Cases
Asset tracking: Blockchain technology can be used for
tracking material assets that are globally distributed, valuable,
and whose provenance is of interest. This includes standalone
items like artwork and diamonds, certified goods like food
and luxury items, dispersed items like fleets of vehicles,
and packages being shipped over long distances, which will
change hands many times in the process. It also includes
the individual components of complex assembled devices,
where the parts originate from different firms. For heavily
regulated industries, like airlines, and for military/intelligence
applications, it is important to establish the source of each
part that has been used, as well as a maintenance history.
While assets are already tracked in digital databases, there
is no common database shared by each participant in the
supply chain.
14In particular, the success of Ethereum contributed to this, although that
project now prefers the term ‘decentalized app’ or dapp for short.
A Blockchain sidesteps the political problem of who
should host such a shared database when the candidates
are competing firms and government agencies from different
jurisdictions. Blockchain technology provides a common
environment where no single firm has the elevated power and
control of running a widely-used database. The main integrity
challenge is the stapling issue: specifying how material
assets are assigned a tracking token on the Blockchain in
a trustworthy manner. A second challenge is the lack of
confidentiality Blockchain technologies offers by default
when the data is proprietary and tied to profitable business
practices. Finally, a third challenge is getting agreement on
the technology to be used (this is being explored through
business consortiums.15).
Identity and key management: Identities, along with
cryptographic attestations about properties for those identities
(e.g., over 18 years of age, has a driver’s license), can be
written to the Blockchain. These identities and attestations can
then be used by other systems to support their access control
policies. Importantly, this identity information comes with full
provenance. This could be useful in determining suspicious
activity (e.g., having an age that is not increasing linearly).
This could also be a quicker and more performant way of
establishing identity than the current certificate authority
system.
Multi-organization data sharing: Asset tracking and
identity tracking are both examples of sharing data across
organizations, and Blockchain technology contributes a
common environment. The use cases in this category share
challenges: Blockchain technology can specify write access
policies to data stored on the Blockchain, but it will not
provide any default support for restricting read access;
confidentiality has to be an additional layer. Further, the
integrity of confidential data cannot be validated by nodes
in the network without some minimal disclosure of what the
data is or that it satisfies the relevant restrictions. Blockchain
can also serve as a secondary component in these systems,
where capabilities are issued and transferred as if they were
financial assets on a Blockchain. Proving ownership over
a capability is done off-chain to a traditional enforcement
server, which enables the correct permissions.
Tamper-resistant record storage: The append-only
ledger is used to store documents, including the history
of changes to these documents. This use case is best suited
for records that are highly valuable (such as certificates,
government licenses), have a small data size, and are publicly
available (as they will be replicated by all miners). If large
and/or confidential documents need to be stored, then the
Blockchain can store binding/hiding commitments for the
documents, while the documents themselves are stored in
another system with lower overhead. Blockchain technology
could be used to timestamp documents. Still, timestamping
15e.g., Blockchain in Transport Alliance
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generally does not rely on any of Blockchain technology’s key
properties, and so Blockchain technology is likely overkill
for this application.
C. Other use cases
Voting: Electronic voting is a challenging problem that
is often asserted to benefit from Blockchain technology’s
properties. Shared governance could be used to ensure
that multiple parties (the government, non-governmental
organizations, international watchdogs) can all work together
to ensure that an election is legitimate. Audibility is important
in providing evidence to the electorate that the election was
fair. Finally, the resilience of Blockchain technology is im-
portant in preventing cyberattacks against the voting system.
However, voting on a Blockchain has many challenges to
solve: Blockchains offer no inherent support for secret ballots,
electronic votes can be changed by the device from which
they are submitted (undetectably if a secret ballot is achieved),
cryptographic keys could be sold to vote buyers, and key
recovery mechanisms would need to be established.
Gambling and Games: Examining the most active
Bitcoin scripts and Ethereum decentralized applications
shows that gambling is quite popular. Players can audit
the game to ensure that execution is fair, and the system
can operate its own cryptocurrency to handle the finances
(including holding the money in escrow to prevent losing
parties from aborting before paying). This use case is best
suited to gambling games that do not require randomness,
private state, or knowledge of off-blockchain events. For the
set of residual games,16 Blockchain is an ideal platform. For
the other types of games, new layers of technology would
have be added on a Blockchain. Data feeds (called oracles)
of either randomness or real world event outcomes requires
additional trust and introduces finality risk, while confidential
user state require additional cryptography.
IoT and smart property: IoT devices occasionally
have the need to collectively make decisions. In these
cases, Blockchain technology can provide a technological
platform for making these collective decisions in an auditable
fashion. This auditability is especially important as IoT
devices are notoriously untrustworthy due to insufficient
security, and the ability to later audit and analyze their
actions is invaluable. Additionally, the replication inherent
to Blockchain technology means that even if a subset of the
IoT devices is lost (e.g., destroyed sensors in a storm), it
can still be possible to record the entire provenance of all
devices.
VII. IS BLOCKCHAIN THE RIGHT SOLUTION?
Blockchain technology provides a unique set of capabilities
that might be better suited for a system design than competing
16Currently, the most active Ethereum game is called Fomo3D: users pay
to reset a 30 second countdown timer and if it ever reaches zero, the last
user to pay wins all the money collected.
database technologies or distributed systems. However it does
come with a relatively high overhead: replicating all past
and present data and operations on the data at every node of
the network in an auditable ledger. Based on our results and
experience we recommend the use of the following questions
to determine if Blockchain technology would be a good fit
for a specific project (see Section III-A for definitions).
1) Does the system require shared governance?
2) Does the system require shared operation?
If the answer to both questions is no, then Blockchain’s
consensus protocol is likely unnecessary overhead. If the
answer to both questions is yes, then Blockchain technology
is likely a good fit. This is due to the fact that meaningful
shared governance and operation requires miners to audit
the operations of others and to be able to recover data that
a malicious miner might try to delete (questions 3 and 4
below, respectively). If only shared governance or shared
operation is needed, then the following two questions can
be used to determine if the auditable ledger and replication,
respectively, justifying the use of Blockchain technology if
both are needed:
3) Is it necessary to audit the system’s provenance?
4) Is it necessary to prevent malicious data deletion?
A. Relationship to other distributed systems
Blockchain technology fits within the broader family
of distributed systems. At the highest level, Blockchain
technology is a type of decentralized database. To help readers
situate Blockchain technology within this greater ecosystem
we have created a taxonomy and a flowchart based on that
taxonomy (see Figure 3).
The first property in our taxonomy considers who has the
authority to manage and update the database: what is the
operation model? In a singularly governed database (“Sin-
gular”), a single entity performs these tasks. Alternatively,
the system can use a consensus protocol to allow for shared
governance (“Shared”).
Next, we consider the security model by asking where
is the root of trust? This refers to the entity or entities
that must behave honestly in order for the system to be
secure. In typical database systems, trust is rooted in the
maintainer (“Maintainer”)—for example, using AWS cloud
storage requires that you trust Amazon. Alternatively, trust
can be rooted in the design of the system itself (“System”),
though this is only possible if the system stores sufficient
provenance for it to be audited to confirm that the system is
functioning as intended.
The next question is what is auditable? In the worst
case, nothing is auditable (“Nothing”). Systems can use an
authenticated data structure [20] to ensure that their current
state can be audited (“Current state”). If the state also contains
a history of the system (e.g., a ledger), then the use of an
authenticated data structure allows for the provenance of
12
DR
AF
T
What is the 
operational model?
Where is the 
root of trust?
What is auditable? What is it 
resilient against?
Database
Database
with consensus
Database
Replicated
database
Maintainer
Monitored
ledger
Database with
consensus
• Data loss
Monitored
database
Replicated
monitored
database
Database with
consensus
Replicated
monitored
ledger
Replicated 
database with 
consensus
Blockchain
Shared
• Data loss
• Detect
Database
Ledger with 
consensus
Nothing
• Data loss
• Prevent
• Data loss
• Detect
• Data loss
• Prevent
Singular
Maintainer Current state
Figure 3: Comparing decentralized databases
the system to also be audited (“Provenance”). In both cases,
it is necessary that these databases be monitored to ensure
that they never enter an invalid state, even temporarily. In
the case of shared operation, the operating entities act as
monitors of the current sate during the consensus protocol.
Finally, we can classify systems by asking what is it
resilient against? In particular, we considered with three
resiliency properties—(1) is it resilient to accidental data
loss (“Data loss”), (2) is it possible to detect that data has
been malicious altered (“Detect”), (3) and is it possible to
prevent malicious updates (“Prevent”). Replication is a simple
solution to prevent against accidental data loss, but by itself it
fails to prevent malicious data loss as the malicious changes
to the database will also be replicated. In singular operation,
external monitors can help detect malicious data changes, but
can only do so after the data has been lost. In shared operation,
the monitors are the operators and malicious deletions and
modifications will not be replicated, preventing them from
effecting the overall system.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss the remaining results from our
grounded theory work.
A. Normative properties
Within the literature we analyzed, there were a set of
properties that were not technical properties directly provided
by Blockchain technology, but rather expressed desired
properties for systems built using Blockchain technology
(i.e., normative properties). These properties are shown in
Figure 4.
The majority of the normative properties focused around
the notion of using Blockchain technology to allow for public
participation. While public participation is certainly possible
with Blockchain technology, as there are many examples of
systems built using Blockchain technology that fail to achieve
these properties. For example, while Bitcoin initially had
a low-cost to participate allowing easy-of-entry for miners
and community ownership, that is no longer the case as any
meaningful participation requires the purchase of a large
amount of specialized hardware and the expenditure of a
significant amount of electricity.
Similarly, the normative properties of low-bar for trust,
disintermediation, no trusted third-parties, censorship resis-
tance, and fast/cheap transaction all require extremely careful
system design to achieve and are not guaranteed by the use of
Blockchain technology. In practice, these properties are often
difficult to guarantee for any system, and this is no different
for Blockchain technology. For example, Bitcoin ultimately
requires trusted third parties (e.g., exchanges, retailers who
accept Bitcoin) to allow the currency to be useful for real-
world application. Also, fast/cheap transactions usually only
exist because Blockchain based systems are not yet regulated
like non-Blockchain systems.
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Figure 4: Normative Properties for Blockchain Technology
When reading documents from industry, normative and
technical properties are often intermingled with each other.
The injection of ideology into a technical field causes
confusion and suboptimal design choices, not to mention
muddying discussion and preventing clarity. Interestingly,
in the concept graph generated by our methodology, the
technical and normative properties were cleanly separated.
No capabilities have dependencies on normative properties
and removing them from the graph does not lessen the value
of the graph as an exploration of technical concepts. The
fact that this separation occurred naturally provides evidence
that grounded theory accomplished our research goals and
was a good choice for addressing this corpus of data.
B. Private Governance
In our survey of the industrial literature, we encountered
several proposals for Blockchain-as-a-Service. While such
services often use true Blockchain protocols, they also use a
centralized governance model where all miners are controlled
by a single entity (i.e., private governance).
We do not classify such systems as Blockchain technology.
First, these systems do not neither shared governance nor
shared operation, which we identify as the key component
of Blockchain technology. Second, the entity operating the
system still represents a single-point of failure. While the
miners within the operating organization might be run on a
distributed infrastructure, there is still a high chance that a
compromise in the operating organization would lead to a
compromise in the Blockchain system. Third, there is nothing
that prevents the governing party from deleting or modifying
data; even if such changes could be detected, the data itself
is not replicated outside the organization and would be lost.
This is not to say that such systems lack value—such an
evaluation is beyond the scope of this paper—but rather we
believe that these types of systems are distinct from the more
decentralized Blockchain technology.
C. Lack of Privacy and Data Discoverability
In the literature we found a common misconception that
Blockchain technology inherently provided confidentiality
for information stored within it. In fact, the opposite is true:
all transactions are visible to all miners, and this is necessary
for miners to validate transactions. The global visibility was
identified by some as a capability (i.e., data discoverability)
that allowed a Blockchain to act as a data lake. While there
were some valid applications of Blockchain as a data lake, in
most cases we found that proposed data lake applications did
not need all of Blockchain technology’s capabilities and that
a simpler solution would have sufficed. It may be possible to
add confidentiality to Blockchain technology, but care must
be taken to ensure that this confidentiality does not preclude
miners’ ability to validate and audit the system. This remains
an open research problem.
D. Ideology, Hype, and Ulterior Motives
Many proponents of Blockchain technology believe that it
has the capability to massively disrupt how society operates,
or at least to rapidly overtake legacy solutions in many
significant industries. This belief is hyperbole, as though
Blockchain technology has many valid uses, it has not, nor
is it likely to achieve this Utopian vision. This ideology and
hype causes problems: for example, frequent emotionally-
charged schisms within Blockchain advocate and developer
communities—especially those affiliated with Bitcoin. This
turmoil prevents level-headed scientific discourse and wastes
developer resources. It can also tangibly affect the stability
of a Blockchain system by causing a fork in which two
independent chains emerge to used and maintained by
different groups, further dividing resources.
With that said, Blockchain’s disruptive power has certainly
been demonstrated in the financial sector, so it clearly
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has promise. Several factors have made this sector an
attractive target for disruption, perhaps none more so than
the opportunity for massive profit. This motive has had
benefits for Blockchain, especially in accelerating the pace
of technological development. However, it has also created
perverse incentives to reinforce hype and ideology. Hype
can attract investors and inflate valuations, and dogmatic
ideology is a proven marketing and recruitment strategy for
financial scammers. These problems inhibit the advancement
of Blockchain technology.
E. Reputation for illicit uses
Due to the prominence of Bitcoin, many people are
familiar with Blockchain first and foremost as the technology
underlying the cryptocurrency and therefore the reputations
of the two are intertwined. The fact that Bitcoin is designed to
avoid banks and central authorities in general, combined with
its well-known history of illicit uses, somewhat poisons the
well for Blockchain as a whole. Along with the causes listed
above (ideology, hype, and ulterior motives), this contributes
to the difficulty of discussing and considering Blockchain
technology with precision and objectivity. It may also have
impeded or delayed its acceptance by organizations unwilling
to associate themselves with the Bitcoin’s poor reputation.
IX. SURVEY OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH ON CHALLENGES
As part of the grounded theory analysis, the data revealed
several open research challenges related to Blockchain
technology. In regards to these challenges, we surveyed the
academic literature to identify what researchers are doing to
address these challenges. In this section, we give a brief over
of the results of our literature survey. This is not intended to
be an exhaustive review of the space, but rather to highlight
areas of substantial work.
A. Blockchain scalability
1) Power consumption and centralization of mining:
To reduce the power consumption of open governance
Blockchain systems that have traditionally relied on a proof-
of-work-based consensus protocols, there have been several
proposals to turn to other consensus mechanisms (for a more
complete survey of this space see [11]). The most popular
of these proposals is proof of stake consensus, where parties’
contribution to the consensus protocol is proportional to the
total amount of stake they own in the system rather than the
amount of work that they do. Today’s proof of stake protocols
(e.g. [32], [33], [34], [35]) vary significantly in their model,
assumptions, and performance guarantees. Other suggestions
for avoiding proofs of work include proof of space [36], [37]
where miners use storage instead of computation, and proof
of elapsed time [38] where trusted hardware (i.e., Intel SGX)
is used in place of proofs of work. It is not clear at this
point which of these solution will be best suited for different
Blockchain deployments.
Another unintended consequence of proof-of-work con-
sensus is the centralization of mining power. In order to
reduce variance in their earnings, miners are incentivized to
work together in large mining pools, pooling their computing
power and sharing the profits among pool members. Currently,
almost 70% of Bitcoin blocks are mined by the five
largest mining pools [25] significantly limiting the actual
decentralization achieved by Bitcoin [26]. Of course, these
pools are disincentivized to damage trust in Bitcoin (and thus
reduce its value and their profits) by abusing their power to
censor transactions or violate rules in other ways. But this
centralization undoubtedly runs counter to the goals of open
governance and may violate security notions that depend on
decentralization. One possible solution [39] is to discourage
mining pool formation by making it impossible to enforce
cooperation between the members.
2) Increasing transaction rates: Another challenge to the
scalability of open governance Blockchain solutions is the
increasing number of transactions. Current systems often
have rather long wait times before a transaction can be
confirmed (e.g., Bitcoin can take several hours to confirm
a transaction [40]). This makes these solutions less than
ideal when immediate transactions are needed, such as when
purchasing physical goods.
A couple of different approaches have been proposed to
deal with this issue. First, a number of hybrid consensus
algorithms (e.g., [35], [41], [42], [43], [44]) aim to reduce
transaction approval times through reducing or eliminating
forks. Most of these work by using “proof-of” style protocols
to elect a committee or a leader who then uses traditional
byzantine fault-tolerant consensus. A second approach for im-
proving transaction rates, especially for financial transactions,
is to make use of payment-channel networks. Such networks
set up pairwise channels between parties to allow transactions
on these channels to occur “off-chain”, i.e., without being
recorded on the ledger; the ledger is then only used for
conflict resolution. Many different flavors of payment-channel
networks achieving various properties have been proposed
(e.g. [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50]) and several such as
the Lightning network [45] are in active development for
financial transactions on top of Bitcoin.
3) Handling increased transaction volume: Another scala-
bility challenge for popular Blockchain-based systems, such
as Bitcoin and Ethereum, is the sheer volume of transactions
that are being added to the ledger. As more and more third-
party services start to use these systems to store and execute
their transactions, these systems have to verify and store
transactions for a variety of unrelated operations. This can
cause the storage and verification work required of miners
to become prohibitively expensive.
Proposed solutions for this problem include sharding
(e.g. [51], [52]) to partition transactions based on the
transaction type or service. This allows different sets of
miners to verify transactions for different services thus
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reducing the amount of verification work each miner must do.
Another more radical approach to deal with this challenge
has been to move away from the “chain” view of Blockchain
technology. Instead, several proposals (e.g., [53], [54], [55])
propose to organize transactions into a directed-acyclic graph
(DAG) where later transactions can vote on the validity of
earlier transactions, allowing transactions to be approved
before global consensus is achieved.
B. Smart contract correctness and dispute resolution
Three different directions have been proposed for im-
proving the correctness and security of smart contracts:
Education and tools to help developers write smart contracts,
tools for evaluating correctness and security of existing
smart contracts, and formal modeling and formal verification
of smart contracts. Along the education path, researchers
organized a class on developing smart contracts cataloging
common mistakes and misunderstandings [56]. Additionally,
tools have been developed to simplify development of
private smart contracts [57]. For evaluation of existing
smart contracts, multiple tools using symbolic execution [58],
machine learning [59], and static analysis [60], [61] have
been developed for detecting bugs and vulnerabilities. Finally,
some efforts to support development of formally verified
smart contracts is underway; for example, the Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM) has been fully defined for interactive
theorem provers [62], which are essential tools for building
formally verified software of any kind. Magazzeni et al. [63]
have laid out a research agenda identifying further ground-
work that must be conducted to support formal verification
of smart contracts.
C. Key Management
Some recent work has also looked into cryptographic
solutions to protect users’ keys. Techniques based on secure
multi-party computation (MPC) [64], [65] allow transactions
to be signed without any party ever having access to the
secret key. Alternatively, the classic technique of threshold
signatures (e.g. [66], [67], [68]) allow users to split their keys
into many pieces such that a large number of them must be
compromised in order to “steal” a user’s key. However, much
work remains to secure all the cryptographic keys inherent
in real-world blockchain deployments.
D. Regulation
As applications of blockchain technology proliferate, they
have drawn significant attention from the regulatory bodies
around the world. In the settings of cryptocurrencies, a
number of concerns such as the prevalence of black-market
transactions, tax evasion, money laundering, and terrorist
financing have drawn calls to regulate how such cryptocur-
rencies can be used. An excellent review article by Kiviat [69]
outlines some of the issues that arise in regulating blockchain
transactions. Additionally, as blockchain applications move
to greater support of smart contracts, researchers have shown
that criminal smart contracts are easily implementable in
today’s smart contract platforms [70] requiring regulation to
avoid such criminal uses of blockchain.
X. RELATED WORK
Different aspects of the Blockchain landscape have been
systemized in past work, however our approach provides a
unique and complimentary perspective. An early comprehen-
sive work is Bonneau et al.’s cryptocurrency systemization
of knowledge [7], which advocates for research on Bitcoin,
merges disparate non-academic sources of information, and
evaluates extensions that begin to tread beyond currency. We
share a common approach of bringing non-academic work
into an academic light, however we take the broader focus
of Blockchain applications beyond cryptocurrencies as our
starting point, we take greater effort at applying a thorough
methodology for the evaluation of non-academic work, and
we draw from a different body of knowledge (i.e., from
industry practitioners instead of the developer community).
More recently, Wu¨st and Gervais develop a flow chart to
answer the question: “do you need a Blockchain” [71], and
they evaluate several use-cases (that overlap with the ones
we extract) with it. The authors use an approach based on
domain knowledge and technical expertise; we purposely
seek to minimize our own researcher bias to ascertain how
non-experts understand the technology. Their flow chart is
compared favorably to 30 similar charts appearing in industry
whitepapers (that overlap with our dataset) and blog posts
studied by Koens and Poll [72]. This minimizes the novelty
of the flowchart we develop in Figure 3, but it is a minor
contribution of this work.
Narayanan and Clark describe the “academic pedigree”
of Bitcoin’s core technical innovations, repudiating the
common belief that Bitcoin was a radical departure from
existing research [6]. The authors touch lightly on the public
(mis)understanding of Blockchain, highlighting some key
misconceptions, however our work explores this thoroughly.
Several surveys deal with specific technical topics includ-
ing consensus and scalability [9], [10], [11], [12], security
vulnerabilities [8], and privacy issues [73]. Our work has the
broader focus of situating Blockchain’s general capabilities
in potential industry use-cases.
XI. SUMMARY
In this paper we answer four common questions regarding
Blockchain technology: (1) what exactly is Blockchain
technology, (2) what capabilities does it provide, and (3)
what are good applications for Blockchain technology, and (4)
how does it relate to other approache distributed technologies
(e.g., distributed databases). We accomplish this goal by using
grounded theory to analyze a large corpus of data produced
by industry. Ultimately, Blockchain technology is neither a
panacea nor worthless. Instead it is a useful tool in a system
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developer’s toolkit that can be applied when its overhead
(consensus and replicated full system provenance) is justified
by the system’s needs (shared governance and operation,
verifiable state, and resilience to data loss). Even though
Blockchain technology does not solve all the problems that
its proponents claim it does, we believe that is a meaningful
technology that will continue to be used in industry and is
deserving of some attention by industry.
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